




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
THE
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
With respect to their Glory, the essential Advantage of their Crowns, and their Conscience, betrayed in the Preliminary Articles, signed at *Aix-la-Chapelle*, the 30th of *April*, 1748.

Translated from the FRENCH.

In the Year MDCCXLVIII.

[Price One Shilling.]





The INTERESTS

Of the Empress Queen, the Kings of France and Spain, and their principal Allies, with respect to their Glory, the essential Advantage of their Crowns, and their Conscience, betrayed in the Preliminary Articles, signed at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748.



HE present Situation of the *French* and *Spanish* Monarchies happens to be the most glorious, they have seen for many Years. Circumstances are now decisive with respect to these Crowns; and if Negotiations do not complete what their Arms have commenced, they are for ever undone; a disadvantageous Peace would only render them extremely unhappy in the midst of their most splendid Triumphs.

The Copies of the Preliminary Articles, hitherto handed about, have thrown all true *Frenchmen* and *Spaniards*, and such Foreigners as are attached to those Crowns, into the utmost Consternation. Vain are the Endeavours that have been, and still are, made to quiet us, by means of the flattering Term of a glorious Peace: those who are more attentive to Things than Words, cannot discern the least Shadow of Glory in a Peace, in which they find neither actual, future, nor solid Advantage. On the contrary, they see nothing but the Source of future Broils and Wars, in which the Crowns of *France* and *Spain*, the two *Sicilies*, and their Allies, will be so much the less capable to maintain their Ground, as their most implacable Enemies will be enabled to attack them hereafter to an Advantage, if these Preliminary Articles prove true, and unless there be some Method taken to modify them at least, in their execution.

I am inclinable indeed to think, for the Honour of a certain Ministry, that these Articles are fictitious, or that they are accompanied with others, in which some real Advantages have been stipulated in favour of the Crowns of *France* and *Spain*, the Knowledge of which our Ministers have thought proper to conceal, for a while,
from

from the Public. But as the Expedition with which this first Draught of the Peace has been signed, may give room to presume they had not time to weigh all its Consequences ; that the Copies which have been made public, tho' different in Arrangement, agree nevertheless in respect to the Substance of their Decisions ; and in fine, that several Things which perhaps escaped their first Reflexions, may be still easily rectified in the Definitive Treaty ; I shall therefore only point out some Heads which to me appear deserving of a more particular Consideration of the Ministry, to whom the whole Glory or Blame of this most important Negotiation must be necessarily ascribed.

The Subject I have before me, very nearly concerns the real honour of the Princes of the House of *Bourbon*, and the Interest of my Country ; it is therefore so engaging, with respect to a Heart sincerely devoted to both, that every other Consideration must give way ; and I hope that no one, but least of all you, Sir, whom the King has raised to the highest Dignities, and loaded with Favours, will condemn the Liberty I take to point out in this short Memorial, the Inconveniences of this System of vain and false Glory, on the Part of the Court of *Versailles*,

sailles, with which some People pretend to colour the pretended Preliminary Articles, signed the 30th of *April*, 1748.

My Country I love, as the Place of my Nativity; my King, for the personal Favours with which he has honoured me: A Zeal therefore so pure and ardent as mine cannot lie still, when it sees those Interests so sacred, so dear, not only in danger, but even visibly sacrificed.

'Tis therefore of the utmost Consequence, and even to the Advantage of the Nations allied against the House of *Bourbon*, an Advantage which consists in settling between them and this House, a solid Peace, a sincere and perfect Reconcilement; 'tis to the Advantage, I say, of those Nations, and of the Courts that direct them, to prevent the Heads of this potent and august House, from having ever any Occasion to repent, in their critical Moments of Reflection, the immense Sacrifices they are inclined to make for the sake of Peace, through their Moderation and natural Magnanimity. A Peace too dearly purchased can never be durable.

I.

IT has been laid down as a fundamental Article of the Peace, *That all the Conquests made since the Commencement of this War,*

War, as well in Europe as in the East and West-Indies, must be restored on both Sides.

After having agreed with regard to the essential Part of those mutual Restitutions in the Preliminary Convention, may it not be a Subject of Examination in negotiating the Definitive Treaty, whether in these Restitutions there be not a great, nay an immense Disproportion? Does the Restitution of *Cape Breton*, how important soever we may suppose that Place, deserve to be set in competition with some Conquests made by the *French* over the *English*, even in *America*, in the Commencement of the War; and with others made towards its Close in the *East-Indies*? Does it merit to be compared with *Austrian* and *Dutch Flanders*, with the Harbour of *Antwerp*, with *Bergen-op-Zoom*, *Mastricht*, and the other Towns of *Dutch* and *Austrian Brabant*, with the conquered Districts of the Counties of *Namur* and *Hainault*, and with the Town and Territory of *Tournay*?

If there be a considerable Disproportion (a Point which is beyond all Dispute) between the Restitution *France* is to make on one side, and *England* on the other, the Excess of this exorbitant Disproportion, ought to turn out, either in the Whole or Part, pursuant to the Principles

ciples of the Laws of Nature and War, to the Advantage of the Nation that has the greatest Sacrifices to make.

II.

IS it fit the Crown of *France* should entirely relinquish the *Netherlands*, either in favour of the Queen of *Hungary*, or of any other Prince whatsoever, were he even a Prince, for whom our Court designed, or to whom it had already given, a Daughter of *France* in Marriage, without excepting out of this Restitution, which the Preliminary Articles represent as general, some particular Towns, which, without considerably extending the ancient Limits of the *French* Monarchy, are nevertheless indispensably necessary for the Security of our Frontiers?

III.

TIS not sufficient to have delivered, by virtue of the Preliminary Articles, the Harbourn of *Dunkirk* from the burdensome Condition of the Treaty of *Utrecht* on the Land Side, unless it be freed at the same time towards the Sea. A Delivery of this kind would be as singular as imperfect. Were the Restraints laid upon this Harbourn to be continued, they might
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 serve

serve as a Pretext for Complaints; these Complaints might furnish Occasion for new Hostilities; and Hostilities would infallibly kindle up a fresh War, either by Sea, or in the *Low Countries*. It would have been therefore proper to have removed for ever those Pretends, of which so surprizing a Use was made in 1742, 1743, 1744, in certain Memorials, which the *French* Ministry never ought to forget. Now it is impossible to prevent the Inconveniences that may arise from these Pretends, how frivolous soever we suppose them, unless the Fate of this Place be definitively settled, nay, and unless it be still better covered by the retaining of *Furnes* and *Newport*.

IV.

CAN our Ministers, without being deficient in what they owe to the Security and national Interest of the *French* Monarchy, neglect to procure a Barrier for its ancient Frontier, by retaining *Mons*, *Menin*, *Ipres*; but especially *Tournay*, which for many Ages was in the Possession of the Crown; in fine, by keeping all those Places which had been torn from her by the Misfortunes of the *Spanish* War?

Necessary it is also to retain the County of *Namur*, not so much to increase the

B

Demeans

Demeans of the Crown, which the King never aimed at, and less in the present, than in any other War, as to contain within the Bounds of the approaching Treaty, the Sovereign who is to be re-instated or introduced into the *Netherlands*, and a Republic that has so flagrantly abused the Favours with which the King had constantly honoured her, and who has carried even to excess her Insults and Ingratitude towards this Monarch, and his Crown.

V.

THE Dignity of this Crown, and the real Glory of the King, requires, that the conquered *Netherlands* be not restored to any Power whatsoever, but upon Condition that the restored Provinces shall return to the ancient Vassallage of the Monarchy, from which they were emancipated by the odious Treaty of *Madrid*. This would be serving both Master and Subjects in a more glorious and useful manner, by preserving those honourable Rights which they have lately recovered by their just Arms, and of which they had been stripp'd by Arms more successful than just, than to amuse themselves with such a trifling Affair as the Abbey of *St. Hubert*. *Istud erat faciendum, & aliud non opittendum.*

VI.

VI.

IT would be dangerous to insist at this juncture, as has been done on some occasions, and still is surmised by those who cannot conceive, that the Enemies of *France* could have extorted from her Ministers so dangerous a Sacrifice as that contained in the pretended Preliminary Articles; it would be dangerous, I say, to insist on the Demolition of the Fortresses of *Luxemburg*, or upon the intire Acquisition of that Dutchy. The *Germanic* Body regards this Place as its only Bulwark on that Frontier; consequently it could not look upon the Loss of it with indifference; a Loss that would infallibly produce Alliances, into which this Body would enter with as much Eagerness as Unanimity, to rescue it again from *France*.

But the keeping of *Namur*, *Charleroi*, *Mons*, *Tournay*, *Ipres*, *Turnes*, and *Newport*, is as indifferent as the Loss of those Towns, to the *Germanic* Body. To retain a Part of Provinces already conquered, is a much more natural means of making Peace, than to endeavour to negotiate new Acquisitions. The first Method can be offensive to no-one, being just, prudent, and expedient; the second is subject to In-

B 3 conveniences,

conveniences, and cannot be used unless the Crown of *France* had occasion, which it has not, to be dissatisfied with the *Germanic* Body ; or the principal Courts of *Germany* were inclinable, which probably is far from being the case, to make spontaneously so precious a Sacrifice to this Crown.

VII.

SECURITY and Indemnity are Objects so essential to a Monarchy, that there is no losing sight of either in a Treaty of Pacification, without betraying even in capital Points, the Confidence and most sacred Interests of the People. Now those Interests and Confidence would be evidently betrayed, were we to resign ourselves without Precaution and Reserve to Nations, whose Jealousy and Hatred we must not expect that even the highest Excess of Favours, or the most magnanimous Sacrifices, will ever be able to extinguish. 'Tis not the same with national Aversions, as with personal Enmities. The latter may be soothed by Benefits ; the former have their Origin in Education and Blood, consequently are eternal. To forego our present Advantages, without securing our Country from the Effects of this Aversion, would be idly exposing it ; would be testifying less regard for
it

it than for her Enemies ; would be furnishing them with the Means of continually insulting it, the Means of renewing their Attacks to a greater Advantage, the Means in fine of sooner or later destroying it.

What Advantage have the Crowns of *France* and *Spain* gained, by sacrificing to the House of *Brunswic-Hanover*, another House which ought to have been dear to them? What has been the Fruit of all the Expence the House of *Bourbon* has been at, to secure the Liberty and Independence of the *United Provinces*, and to get them erected and acknowledged by all *Europe* as a Sovereign Republic? What Benefit have we had from the advantageous Treaties of Commerce granted to the *Dutch*, in prejudice to our own Country; from the Vigor with which the Court of *Versailles* exerted itself to suppress the *Ostend* Company; and in fine, from the constant and distinguished Regard which our Court paid, both in Peace and War, to this Republic, till the Year 1747? All these Favours contributed only to procure Riches to those Powers; Riches which they have exhausted, in order to ruin the Credit of the *French* Crown in the North, to arm the rest of *Europe* against her, and to exterminate

terminate in all Parts the Commerce of *France* and *Spain*.

Vain would it be to flatter ourselves with the Hopes of gaining the *English* and the *Dutch*; of persuading them to embrace a different System of Politics with regard to *France*; or of changing their Hearts by a long Series of new Benefits: The Attempt would never succeed.

God forbid I should absolutely condemn all Beneficence of this kind! I am convinced we should constantly practise it; I wish only it were attended with Precaution, and a Magnanimity consistent with the Security of our Country. In short, I should be glad that while we endeavour, by constant good Offices, to deprive these two Nations of the Inclination of hurting us, we deprived them, at the same time, of the Means, by incorporating with the Crown some Fortresses that formerly belonged to it, and which we have lately recovered by the Superiority of our Arms.

In vain should we endeavour to cloak so capital a Neglect, by these frivolous Arguments: *France* is sufficiently strong by the Weakness of her Neighbours; she is invincible on her own Frontiers; her Enemies will not dare to attack her again a long while; she has no occasion to extend her

her Territories; a new Barrier would only make the old one fall to decay; she would be obliged to keep up a greater Number of Troops in time of Peace; and the maintaining or repairing of so many Fortresses would be too great a Charge to the Royal Treasury. These are such wretched Pretexts for People of good Sense, that 'tis infinitely surprizing any one should propose to build on such palpable Absurdities, the Plan of a Pacification on which our Country's Fate depends. The neighbouring Powers, though weak at present, may become very strong in ten Years. All they want is a good Administration, which, rare as it is, cannot be said to be impossible. No Power should flatter itself with the Notion of being invincible; too much Confidence or Security has ruined the most flourishing Monarchies. *France* has a good Barrier; but we have a convincing Proof from the present War, that this Barrier may be forced; and the Fate of Arms being uncertain, 'tis very possible it may be forced with as much Facility as that of our Enemies in 1744, 1745, and 1746. The more this Crown weakens itself by Wars and useless Treaties, the more its implacable Enemies will presume to attack it. This she herself has experienced in the several

veral Vicissitudes of War; the more these Vicissitudes proved fatal to her, the more Alliances and Enemies started up to distress her; the stronger she is, the less she will have occasion to apprehend being insulted. 'Tis far from being true that the Commerce of such Towns as would form the new Barrier, must ruin the Trade of the old one; the Revenues of these new Towns, and their respective Territories reunited to the Crown, would be sufficient, if unapplied to other Uses, to maintain large Garrisons, to keep the Fortifications in good Order, and to make their Commerce flourish. Besides, there cannot be a more pernicious Oeconomy to *France*, than too great a Reduction, in time of Peace, either in the Army or Navy.

VIII.

THE Inflexibility of the Court of *Vienna* in refusing to be reconciled to the House of *Bourbon*, has been fatal to the latter, without being of any manner of Service to the former. But to what must we attribute this Inflexibility? To what, but to the Obstinacy of the Maritime Powers, one of which essayed all possible Measures to continue the War, and render it general; and the other would never listen to the

the repeated Instances with which she was solicited by the House of *Bourbon*, to render herself Arbitratrix of the Peace. Thus the War was carried on by means of their common Subsidies. But God has punished this Inflexibility, by making it fall on its principal Authors. Would it be therefore reasonable, notwithstanding the Decisions of Providence, which have been manifested so evidently in the latter Events of the War, that the Empress Queen should alone bear all the Weight and Punishment of this suggested Inflexibility? And would not this be the case in respect to that worthy Princess, were the general Restitutions, published in the Preliminary Articles, to be literally executed? Is it not proper to soften her Fate by Exceptions, which might render this Restitution of some Utility? This is the only means of being perfectly reconciled to her. A Reconciliation of this kind might be perpetuated by very easy means; and if there be any Method left, that can render the Interests of the Courts of *Vienna*, *Versailles*, and *Madrid*, in respect to the *Netherlands*, henceforward inseparable, would it not be proper to have recourse to it in the general Pacification, tho' it were to displease some People; who are known to be as indolent and dastardly Friends, as they are furious and

and violent Enemies. These Means are notwithstanding certain, natural, and lawful, would these Courts but try them in good earnest.

IX.

RELIGION, methinks, ought to have some place in a general Treaty of Pacification, as well as natural Prudence, tho' the principal Matter relates only to temporal Interests. In consequence of this Principle, ought we not to weigh even mere temporal Settlements with the maturest Deliberation, when proposed in Favour of a Power, who professes a Religion different from that in which we glory, and which may tend some time to the Prejudice of what we think the best Persuasion? And if among various Regulations whereby it is expedient to rectify the Preliminary Articles, there should be luckily any one not subject to this Inconvenience, do not the first Rules of Christianity inform us, that it is preferable to any other?

X.

THOSE who are Friends to the Balance of Power in *Europe*, would be glad, and perhaps with some Appearance of Reason, to see our Ministers take into their serious

rious Consideration, whether the late Re-stitution of the conquered Towns and Provinces of the *Dutch*, be not, tho' an indirect, yet exorbitant Increase of Power in the House of *Hanover*: whether the Junction of the Father and Son-in-Law's Forces, produced by the Election of the Stadtholder, and the great Influence the Court of *London* has acquired by means of this Election, over the principal Resolutions of the States-General, may not prove fatal to her Neighbours as well by Sea as Land: in short, whether this Influence does not establish an universal Monarchy by Sea, by furnishing the *English* with the Means of invading the principal Branches of the Commerce of the United Provinces, and of insensibly swallowing them up.

XL

TIS likewise of the utmost Consequence to procure a Revocation of the Resolution taken in favour of the hereditary Stadtholdership in the Female Line: because this Resolution, so singular in every respect, tends not so much to introduce, as to perpetuate the Union of these Provinces: to fix their Sovereignty in the House of *Nassau*, and to transfer it afterwards to that of *Hanover, Prussia, or Baden Durlach*: and the

the exorbitant Increase of Power in one of those three Houses, must tend only to reduce the other Families of the Empire, and to excite in that Country most dangerous and intestine Wars, in which all *Europe* would be obliged at length to take share. 'Tis indifferent, very indifferent to the World, whether the *Dutch* have a Stadtholder or not; whether the Prince of *Nassau* be their Stadtholder preferable to any one else; all this is a matter of too small Importance to merit being debated by a general Congress: but the Case is otherwise with respect to the Preservation of the Liberty of the United Provinces; this is an Object in which too many Powers are concerned, not to deserve being examined in that Assembly.

XII.

TIS therefore a matter of equal Concernment to prevent the Nature and Form of the Republican Government, in the United Provinces, from being subverted, in order to make room for an arbitrary Government, which, notwithstanding its present Republican Mask, begins daily to gain more ground.

A Resolution of this kind would give a just Pretence to the Heirs of the House of
Austria,

Austria, to renew their ancient Claims to these Provinces and their Dependancies; because it was never the Intent of the Kings of *Spain* to alienate their Right of direct and useful Dominion over them, but upon condition they should be erected into a free Republic; much less did they design to make a Present of this Dominion to the Princes of the House of *Nassau*, or their Posterity. *Charles IX*, *Henry III*, *Henry IV*, *Lewis XIII*, *Lewis XIV*, *Lewis XV*, had no Notion, no more than the Kings of *Portugal*, of favouring the Erection and Preservation of this Sovereignty, but upon condition it eternally adhered to its Republican Government, and that its Wealth and Possessions, as well in the old as new World, should never devolve to their capital Enemies. In fine, there is not a single Neighbour of those Provinces, but has a Right to challenge the Towns, Fortresses, and Territories which this Republic has extorted from them by different Treaties, under the pretence of a Barrier, and which have been ceded to them only upon a Supposition they would always continue in the Form of Government they were in, when those Treaties were made. The reason is, because a pacific and trading State is useful, as well to its Neighbours, as to the rest of the World; whereas
its

its Neighbourhood grows dangerous, as soon as it becomes a military and absolute Power.

Besides, were a Sovereign to make himself Master of the Forces and Riches of the Republic, he would be sure to lay Schemes of increasing the Colonies and Commerce of his Subjects; which must inevitably turn out to the Disadvantage of *Portugal, Spain and France*: sure he would be likewise to favour the clandestine Trade which the *Zelanders* and their Confederates have always carried on to the *Caracoes* and elsewhere, contrary to the Faith of Treaties: in fine, were this Sovereignty to pass from the Males to the Females of the reigning Line, the House of *Brandenburg*, and other Families, would be deprived of their incontestable Rights to some Demeans inclosed in the Territory of this Sovereignty, which ought to devolve to them, as well by reason of the Nature of those Demeans, as by virtue of the Titles which promise a Reversion of them to those Families.

XIII.

IT would certainly be an Action unworthy the Royal Majesty and the Grandeur of the Crown, an Action in itself conducive to make even remotest Posterity, though
 2 unjustly,

unjustly, believe either that the *French* Ministers are indifferent with respect to the most atrocious Insults done to their Master, or else are ignorant of the true Point of Honour; to proceed to the Restitution of the conquered Possessions of the *Dutch*, without having previously obtained a public and solemn Satisfaction for the Injuries and Calumnies addressed even to the King himself, in several Writings, Speeches, and Pasquinades, in which his Majesty's Declarations are turned into Ridicule; in fine, in the most bitter and insulting Resolutions, either printed under the Inspection and with the Privilege of the States or Towns, or published by the States General themselves.

XIV.

IS it possible, without injuring, in a most sensible manner, the sacred Majesty of a Monarch, who is the most faithful Ally in the Universe, a Monarch the most moderate and disinterested that ever graced the Throne; is it possible, I say, they could have pushed their Insolence and Outrageousness so far, as to point this Prince out, the 14th of May, 1747, in a public Ceremony, on which the Stadtholder was introduced into the national Assemblies, under the injurious Expressions of an *ambitious and* *perfi-*

perfidious Neighbour, who makes a Jest of the Faith of the most sacred Oaths and the most solemn Treaties? Was not the Heinousness of this Insult, already aggravated by the Publicness of the Impression, still much more heightened by the menacing Orders given to a News-Writer, to insert the Word *perfidious*, for which he had left a Blank? Can such an Injury be pardoned? Would not its Impunity increase the Example; and is there Blood enough left in the *United Provinces* to wash it out, could it be expiated by nothing but Blood?

And yet these are the People who, in the pretended Preliminary Articles, are put upon a Level with the *Genoese*; the People who are more favoured than the King of *Spain* and the rest of the Allies of *France*, at the very Time the King, by being Master of the two principal Keys of their Country, is in a Capacity of leaving the most dreadful Monuments of his just Vengeance to remotest Posterity.

And yet these are the very People, whose Welfare the Negotiators of the Preliminary Articles seem to have more at heart, than the Interest of the Empress-Queen, or the Glory of their own Master.

every thing would be according to the exactest Order and Equity.

XVII.

'TIS the Opinion of a great many, that the Pre-eminence of the Imperial Crown, as well as that of *France*, *Spain*, and even of *England*, have been struck at, by the late extraordinary Ceremonial in making the Plenipotentiaries enter the Hall of the public Conferences, by four or five different Doors; a Ceremonial which admits the Ministers of *Genoa*, *Sardinia*, *Modena*, and *Holland*, to dispute the Point of Precedency with the Ministers of the first Houses and Crowns of *Europe*; even with the Minister acknowledged as Imperial by all the other Ministers of the Congress; except those of the House of *Bourbon*; even with the Ministers of superior Courts, with which they are either intimately allied, or with which their Masters are not directly at War. And yet how natural would it have been to have regulated this Ceremonial in such a manner as not to injure the Prerogatives of those Houses and their Crowns, by agreeing there should be only two Doors to the Hall of the public Conferences, namely one for the Minister of the Court of *Versailles* and the Minis-

sters of her Allies, and the other for the Minister of the Court of *Vienna*, and the Ministers of that Court's Allies; and so to exclude absolutely from the public Conferences all those who would not comply with this Regulation, and to be resolute upon this Article, which equally interests the Dignity of *Great-Britain*, with that of several other Crowns.

XVIII.

THE Affectation of the *Dutch* Ministers in using only the Door assigned to the Minister of *London*, has been a Subject of great Surprize. There might have been Instances of this Ceremonial in King *William's* Time, who was King of *England* and Stadtholder of *Holland*; so that notwithstanding his Ministers represented two different Powers, yet they represented still only one Head; but these Examples ought not to be made a Precedent. Would not the present Singularity incline People to think, that though the *Dutch* are not directly at War with any of the Powers of *Europe*, yet they dispute the Precedency with them all, except that of *London*: Which would be equally injurious to the Imperial, *French*, *Spanish*, *Genoese* and *Sardinian* Ministers, whose Precedency over them is incontestable;

XV.

THE acknowledging the Grand Duke as Emperor, is founded on very good Reasons. This Prince is extremely worthy of the Throne to which he has been raised; but since the *French* Ministry grant him a Dignity they were not compelled to grant, might they not have contrived to render him more pliable with respect to the Sovereignty of the Order of the Golden Fleece, referred by the pretended Preliminary Articles to the subtle and uncertain Negotiations of a Definitive Treaty? If these Articles be true, what Construction can the Court of *Spain* put upon so remarkable a Regard, which is here paid to the Emperor's Interests, in preference even to those of the House of *Bourbon*, with whom a Right is contested inseparable from the *Spanish* Monarchy; a Right provisionally ceded to the Emperor *Charles* VI. only in quality of King of *Spain*; a Right entirely and indivisibly secured to the King of *Spain* alone, by the Treaty of *Vienna*, in 1725. and which the Preliminary Articles would vainly render dubious, and subject to debate.

XVI.

SHOULD the Preliminary Articles prove true, *Spain* would have as much Reason to complain, as if we had made a separate Peace. She, to whom a Restitution of the Isle of *Minorca* or *Gibraltar* was offered, upon condition of agreeing to a Peace independent of *France*, would see herself deprived of the Reward she might naturally expect from her Fidelity: She would see the Differences that first gave Occasion to the War in 1738 and 1739, between her and *England*, undecided in the Preliminary Convention, and referred to the Negotiations of a Congress, under a vague and frivolous Promise, that her Interests should be there regulated on the Footing of such Treaties as were most advantageous to this Crown, the Renewal of which would be undoubtedly attended with all the Solemnity that must render them eternally inviolable. But is there not Reason to apprehend they would not be more scrupulously observed, than they have been for the time past? No; no: The Restitution of *Port Mahon* or *Gibraltar* should have been settled by the Preliminary Articles, and the *American* Disputes might have referred to the Definitive Treaty: And then every

of *France*; the Invasions of *Provence* during the present, and the *Spanish* War, rendering it absolutely indispensable. There are a great many other Reasons besides, which should have determined our Ministers to have used this Precaution in the Preliminary Convention, and will undoubtedly determine them to insist upon it in the Definitive Treaty. Is it not reasonable that the Ministers of *France* and *Spain* should make the Court of *Turin* feel the same Inflexibility they felt on his side, upon attempting to prevent or break his Alliance with their Enemies?

XX.

THE intire re-instating of the *Genoese*, and the Abolition of the Treaty of *Worms*, stipulated in the Preliminary Articles, but without any proper Indemnity, or without allowing them a strong Barrier, to secure them hereafter against the like Attempts, is indeed a very imperfect Satisfaction; a Satisfaction much inferior to the essential Service their Valour and Love of Liberty have done to the House of *Bourbon*, by facilitating the Preservation of *Provence*, and opening to us again the Gates of *Italy*. In short, to omit procuring for the *Genoese* in the Treaty of Peace, all the

the Advantages promised them in the particular Treaty concluded between them and this House, would be an Infidelity inconsistent with Honour and Justice.

XXI.

DOES not the provisional and temporary Establishment of the Infant Don *Philip* in the Dutchies of *Parma, Placentia*, and *Guastalla*, tho' in itself somewhat honourable, fall vastly short of the Rights this Infant acquired by the Cession which the Kings, his Father and Brother, and the Queen his Mother, have made him of their Claims to the Successions of the Houses of *Austria, Farnese, and Medicis*? Yes really it does; and the reasonable and impartial Public is quite in the right to consider it only as a simple Plaster applied by an hostile or ignorant Hand, and fitter to palliate than to heal the deep Sores the present War has made in the House of *Bourbon*. After this War has cost the Lives of upwards of five hundred thousand *French, Spaniards, Genoese, and Neapolitans*; after these Nations have spent upwards of fourteen or fifteen hundred millions of Livres to support it; what is the Purchase of so much Blood and Treasure? Three small Dutchies, exhausted by frequent Wars, and of which the House of *Bourbon*

able; whether they pretend to justify this Singularity, under the Notion of a Maritime Power, which would be a Thing hitherto unheard of; or whether they should attempt to excuse it upon any other Title whatsoever.

Since there is a Possibility therefore of settling these Things upon a right Footing, it would be very requisite to do it directly, lest *Europe* should suspect, that the present Imperial Ministers are not so nice upon the Point of Honour as their Predecessors, by allowing their own Allies to dispute an incontestable Rank with them; and that the Ministers of *Versailles* have less Attention to preserve the Prerogatives of the Crown, than was shewn under *Henry IV. Lewis XIII. and Lewis XIV.* whose Ministers maintained their Pre-eminence with as much Zeal as Glory and Success?

This Remark merits so much the more Attention, as Custom commonly establishes on these Occasions a kind of Prescription, on which each Power has a Right to insist, and actually does insist, upon every Occasion that offers, notwithstanding all the Reservations of other Persons Rights which may be added to those Regulations.

XIX.

AS it is unbecoming to let so modern and petty a King as the King of *Sardinia*, dispute the Point of Precedency with the first Houses and Crowns of the Universe, at the very time he has so good an Understanding with them, particularly with the Imperial Court; so it would be, on the other hand, extremely dangerous, to restore to him the Dutchy of *Savoy*, and the rest of the Territories he has lost during the present War, before he has made a Restitution to the Crown of *France* of the Fortres of *Demont*, with its Dependancies, of the Bailiwicks of the *Briançonnais*, with the other Districts, of which this Crown was unhappily stripp'd during the *Spanish War*, by the Intrigues of the Court of *Turin*. A Court whose Power is so much increased, within so short a time, and by Treaties we all know, and which has considerably encroached upon all its Neighbours, not one excepted, is now grown very dangerous; and 'tis of the utmost Consequence to the Welfare and Tranquillity of *Italy*, to fix his Dominions within Limits which he may not find it so easy a matter to pass.

This Precaution is equally necessary for the Security of the Provinces of the Crown
of

Bourbon may be divested; in a Month or a Year, but infallibly in a very short Number of Years, if there be any truth in the Clauses annexed to this Settlement. Three Dutchies that stand quite alone; exposed on all sides to daily Invasions, and inaccessible to those Armies that might be sent to their Defence, unless we had a mind to waste as much Blood and Treasure to preserve them, as we have lavished to acquire them. Three Dutchies, in fine, which lie very convenient for the Court of *Vienna*, without having any Conveniency in the least for those of *Versailles* and *Madrid*. Is the Blood of *French* and *Spaniards* then so cheap? Are the Contributions raised for the Support of the present War, or which may hereafter be raised for the Preservation of this chimerical Settlement, of so little Value, as to be thus wantonly lavished for trifles?

And tho the Clause of Reversion of the Dutchies of *Parma* and *Placentia*, stipulated in favour of the Court of *Vienna*, seems to give it some Appearance of Solidity, and the Reversion of the Dutchy of *Guastalla* promised to the House of *Modena*, has a Shew of Indemnity to this Family; yet the Establishment of *Don Philip*, for this very Reason, is a mere Bawble; considering the Price it costs, the little it is

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worth, the small Profit the Infant will receive from it, and the short Space of Time the House of *Bourbon*, in all probability, will enjoy it. This Article merits, without doubt, to be revised in the future Negotiations of the Congress, since the Means of regulating it after a manner more agreeable, to the Glory and Advantage of the interested Courts, are extremely easy.

XXII.

IT would be losing sight, not only of the Security of the States and Allies of the House of *Bourbon* in *Italy*, but likewise of the Balance of Power in that Part of *Europe*, to neglect procuring for this House, the same Facility of defending them in case of need, as the *Austrians* have of invading them whenever their Fancy suggests. The latter may pour their Troops into *Italy*, without any Impediment, by the Dutchy of *Mantua*, and the County of *Tyrol*, whenever they have a mind to invade some new Estate, or have occasion to preserve those they possess. The *French* and *Spaniards* cannot penetrate on their side, without exposing the Lives of a hundred thousand Men. Prudence therefore, as well as the Importance of the Subject, requires it should be definitively settled in the Congress, in such

a manner that either *France*, the *Infant*, or *Spain*, may divide with the *Genoese*, whatever the House of *Savoy* formerly possessed, or still possesses on the Coast of the *Mediterranean*. Without some Regulation of this kind, no Security for *France*, no Security for the *Genoese*, none for the rest of *Italy*. No Equality therefore, no Proportion between the Advantages of the *Austrians*, who are always in Possession of one of the Keys of *Italy*, and those of the *French* and *Spaniards*, who in all probability would never have one at their Disposal; because the *Genoese* are so poorly rewarded in the Preliminary Articles, for intrusting those Nations with it, that 'tis very unlikely they would ever trust them again, unless they are better recompensed in the Definitive Treaty.

XXIII.

THE Guaranty of the Pragmatic Sanction of *Charles VI.* stipulated by the Preliminary Convention, with the Exceptions there expressly made, merits more Attention than some People may imagine, before it is erected into a Definitive Law, obligatory to all *Europe*. This Guaranty, and these Exceptions in the same Treaty, include most obvious Contradictions, and give

Rise to an infinite Number of Inconveniences.

The above-mentioned Guaranty has been already assented to by the principal Powers of *Europe*, and either directly or indirectly broke by them all. Is it then to be imagined, that the new-promised Guaranty will be better observed by such Parties as are convinced of its being infinitely prejudicial to them, or by their Descendants, whenever they can find an occasion to infringe it in their Turn, and to some Purpose and Advantage?

By the Treaties of *Warsaw* and *Fuesen*, as well as by later Conventions, some small Indemnities have been promised to the Houses of *Saxony* and *Bavaria*: How then can these Promises be reconciled with the Guaranty expressed in the Preliminary Articles?

The Courts of *Berlin* and *Turin* are promised a Guaranty of the dismembered Branches of the *Austrian* Succession, and a temporary Satisfaction is given to the Court of *Madrid*. Now can we flatter ourselves that this Dispensation of the Execution of the Pragmatic Sanction granted to one, and the Obligation of conforming to it, imposed on the others, is a proper means to reconcile sincerely the next Heirs, to this

this Division, and to the Guaranty which some pretend they will be compelled to renew; and that their Descendants will consider themselves under any sort of Obligation from a Ratification, which their Ancestors made, of so gratuitous a Preference?

Do they pretend we shall ever regard the Titles of those privileged Courts, as more incontestable and sacred, than the natural Rights of the Descendants of the Emperor *Joseph*, to the proper and unalienable Possessions of their Ancestors?

At least these Exceptions tend to convince the Universe, that the Motives of *the Glory of God, the Good of Nations, the Advantage of Religion, and the Necessity of preserving the Balance of Power in Europe*, were all a Chimera; that this Sanction which they pretended to make all *Europe* respect as a sacred and inviolable Law, was imperfect with respect to some Families, in whose Favour it is violated; and valid in regard to others, since it is guarantied anew; that it was allowable therefore for some Courts, without a Breach of Equity or Conscience, to make a direct or indirect Attack upon this Sanction; though it be not permitted to make any future Attempt against it, without



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out violating both. Vain and contradictory Ideas, which only forebode fresh Wars and Disturbances to *Germany* and *Europe*! And yet it would have been extremely easy to have avoided this Inconveniency, by extinguishing the natural Rights of those Houses that have been forgot; by indemnifying, which was no hard Matter, the Court of *Vienna*, in another Shape, supposing this Indemnity to be just and expedient; and by leaving the Pragmatic Sanction of *Charles VI.* in the State of Annihilation, to which the Treaties of *Worms*, *Warsaw*, *Dresden*, and even the Preliminary Articles, have already, by their Exceptions, reduced it, in order to substitute in the Definitive Treaty some other Regulation in its stead, more proper to perpetuate the Tranquillity of *Europe*.

XXIV.

AS the Restitutions expressed in the Preliminary Articles are far from being relished by particular Nations, so these Nations are as little satisfied with the Determinations relative to the Indemnities due to them. In fact, the *French* and *Spaniards*, for instance, must have a very odd way of thinking, to be pleased with Decisions, which, in recompence of their Victories,

tories, and the Treasure and Blood they have expended, of the Ardour with which they exposed themselves for the Glory of their Kings, to new Perils and Triumphs; which, I say, for all this, do not reinstate them *in statu quo prius*, but leave them, on the contrary, infinitely weakened by the Loss of upwards of four hundred thousand Men, by the Useless exhausting of their Finances, and by the almost total Ruin of their Navy and Commerce.

Melancholy and very hard, indeed, would be their Lot, contemptible ever after their Alliance and Protection, if they could not take up Arms any more, not even in their own Defence, or that of their Allies, but at the Danger of infallibly losing their Means, if they were vanquished, or of exhausting themselves in vain, in case they were victorious; without ever daring to hope for the least Recompence for their Labours, the least Indemnity for exhausting themselves, or the least Satisfaction for their Losses. And yet this is the strange, absurd and unjust System, which seems to serve as a Basis to the Preliminary Articles; unless the *French* Ministers have some infallible means *in petto*, of reconciling them better in the Definitive Treaty, to the Glory of
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their Master, and the Welfare of the Monarchy.

XXV:

IT will not be amiss to observe, that this System is exactly the same as that which the Author of the *Historical Mercury*, of the *Epilogueur*, and of so many other wretched Papers, the Aim of which is to render even the most innocent Steps of the Princes of the House of *Bourbon* suspected and odious to all *Europe*, has endeavoured to establish, in a Pamphlet published in 1747, and intitled, *Advice to the Negotiators of the Peace*. There he produces several ancient Plans of dividing the *Low Countries*, and an old Memorial attributed to a Minister of the Court of *London*, whereby he intends to prove, that *Europe* should never suffer the House of *Bourbon* to settle in *Italy*, or to retain any of its Conquests in the *Netherlands*. By the temporary and provisional Establishment promised to the Infant Don *Philip*, Part of this Plan would be literally enough executed with respect to *Italy*; and by a general Restitution of our Conquests, the other Part would be performed to the full Rigour in regard to the *Low Countries*. How glorious, how sweet a Consolation would
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this be to *Rouffet*, to have had so great an Influence, by his Advice, on the Preliminary Articles?

XXVI.

THE Introduction and Establishment of this System would be as fatal to *Europe*, as dishonourable to the House of *Bourbon* and its Crowns. The most cruel Outrages might be henceforward committed against this House, its People and Allies; the most unjust Wars might be declared against them; they might be stript of their most sacred Rights; Attempts might be made to reduce the Bounds of *France* as far back as the *Somme*, the *Seine*, or even as the *Loire*; and if the Invasions of *Alsace* had succeeded, it might have been lawful to have wrested from this Crown, the Provinces of *Alsace*, *Lorrain*, Part of the Dutchy of *Luxemburg*, with the Cities of *Antibes*, *Toulon* and *Marseilles*. But since the Breath of the God of Armies has blasted such unjust Confederacies and Attempts; since Providence has shed its most precious Blessings on our Arms, in favour of us and our Allies; since it has pleased the Almighty to crown our Efforts, and to defeat those of our Enemies, shall we surrender

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every thing to Courts, who, were they in our Place, would restore us nothing?

No Indemnity therefore for us, none for our Allies? Have we triumphed for them and ourselves in vain? Are we forbid to repossess, by our just Arms, Part of those Rights and Demeans, of which we have been stript unjustly? Are the Kings of *France* and *Spain* to be debarred from making a proper Use of their Advantages, by revenging themselves of their Enemies, whom God has given up into their Hands, or at least by reducing their Power? Can any thing be more shocking? Would it not be, once more I say it, tempting Providence, abusing God's Benefits, and rendering ourselves unworthy of them hereafter, to split voluntarily and deliberately against so visible a Rock, upon which the Nation, sooner or later, must inevitably perish? For never should we find another Ally to espouse our Quarrel; so that we cannot abandon the Interest of our Allies, without hurrying to our own Destruction.

XXVII.

THE Empress-Queen, the Crowns of *France* and *Spain*, and the Republic of *Genoa*, are, in the main, the only Powers

Powers sacrificed in the Preliminary Articles.

1. The King of *Prussia* is recompensed, though there was no manner of occasion to mention his Interests, since he had nothing to do with the War that was to be extinguished, or stopt by the signing of these Articles.

2. The Indemnity of the Court of *Turin* is reserved, notwithstanding the Abolition of the Treaty of *Worms*.

3. The *Genoese* are left without Indemnity or Security, notwithstanding the Faith of Treaties concluded with that Republic.

4. *England*, indeed, makes a great Sacrifice; but she is recompensed for it, by an equivalent, or almost equivalent Restitution. This Crown suspends the prodigious Success of its Naval Expeditions; but at the same time, it stops as prodigious a Progress of the *French* Armies in the *Netherlands*. It reprieves ungrateful Provinces from the Punishment they deserved; Provinces which, by the Loss of *Mastricht*, would have been soon obliged to drown themselves, to avoid the Vengeance of a Crown, to which they owe their Creation, Preservation, all that they are and have been, and whose Favours were never repaid, not even at the very Time they were

bestowed, but by Disservices, Hostilities of all Kinds, and by an Antipathy in which they take care to bring up their Inhabitants, even from their tender Infancy. *England* recovers also for the Court of *Vienna*, by the Preliminary Articles, a Country which that Crown considers as a Barrier for the Maritime Powers; and if we can give Credit to some secret Articles that have got wind, it procures for the *Dutch* a more convenient Barrier than what they lost. It contrives a Method of referring its Differences with *Spain*, to the future Discussions of the Congress. The Treaty of *London* in 1718. is renewed, and the House of *Stuart* expressly abandoned. Consequently the Crown of *England* makes, in every respect, the most honourable and advantageous Peace she could possibly expect, from her past Obstinacy in continuing the War, and from the present Conjunctions.

But 'tis quite otherwise in respect to the Empress Queen, and the House of *Bourbon*. They and their Allies are condemned by the Preliminary Convention to bear the whole Weight of the War.

1. The House of *Bourbon* renounces voluntarily, as well in *Italy*, as the low Countries, a Superiority which promised a speedy Conquest of *Gavi*, *Final*, and *Savona*

vona to the *Genoese*. The Abolition therefore of the Treaty of *Worms* ought not to be considered as an Advantage to them, since this Treaty might have been soon abolished by Force of Arms. To the *Dutch*, on the other hand, this Superiority forebode a further dismembring of their Provinces, which the Preliminary Articles preserve. These People had every thing to apprehend, and nothing to hope from the Continuation of the War; while the *Genoese* have nothing to fear, but every thing to hope, if they are timely and effectually supported. In this respect, the Condition of the Allies of the House of *Bourbon* is a great deal worse than that of her Enemies.

2. By the Preliminary Articles the Maritime Powers recover all they have lost by the present War, *viz.* their own Territory and their Barrier; while the House of *Bourbon* recovers neither the Barrier nor Territory they lost by the *Spanish* War. The whole Glory therefore and Profit of the Preliminary Convention are in favour of the Maritime Powers; while Shame and Loss are reserved for the Empress Queen, and the House of *Bourbon*.

3. By the same Articles, a Guaranty is stipulated in prejudice to the Empress Queen,
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of that part of the Treaty of *Worms* which to her is injurious, of the Treaties of *Breslau* and *Dresden*, and the Restitution of the *Austrian Netherlands* in their present Situation. But as the Fortresses demolished by the *French* are all in that part of the Low Countries which is to be restored to the Empress Queen; and on the other hand the Fortresses preserved, and even meliorated, are all contained in that part which is to be restored to the *Dutch*, is it not evident that the Interests of the Empress Queen are infinitely more neglected in this Restitution, than those of that Republic?

Besides, the Provinces restored to the Empress Queen have been five Years the Theatre of War, whereas that part whose Restitution is promised to the *Dutch*, has been the Seat of War only one Year. Consequently the former is four times more exhausted than the latter; a new Circumstance, which produces a very considerable Disparity between the re-instating of the Queen, and that of the *Dutch*. Plain therefore it is, that by the Omission of Indemnities due to the Crown of *France*, and the Empress Queen, the whole Weight of the War must fall upon these two Powers, and the Allies of *France*.

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Interests in appearance so opposite might be reconciled.

1. By securing, as we have already hinted, to the Crowns of *France* and *Spain*, the Possession and Restitution of such Places as they possessed before the War, terminated by the Treaty of *Utrecht*.

2. By indemnifying the Empress Queen, by reuniting to *Austrian Flanders*, or to *Austrian Brabant*, all their dismembered Branches, or at least the Forts and Toll-Houses which obstruct the free Navigation of the *Scheld*.

This is the only way to indemnify that Princess in the *Netherlands*, and to render the Restitution mentioned in the Preliminary Articles of some Utility to her. Besides, without this Advantage, the Restitution of those Provinces would be only a Burthen to her, because she would be obliged to exhaust her other hereditary Dominions to maintain them. This is what *Charles VI.* declared in express Terms, at a time when this Country was very far from being in so wretched a Situation as at present. The Court of *Vienna* has no other Resource left to retrieve the Commerce of those Countries, whose Restitution she has been promised, than to free the

the *Scheld* from those Forts, Toll-Houses, and foreign Duties. This Freedom is therefore an Object which the Imperial Ministers cannot but insist upon in the Definitive Treaty, without depriving their Mistress of the Fruits she has a right to expect from the Restitution stipulated in the Preliminary Articles.

Even the *English* themselves would find a considerable Advantage in this Regulation, because they might send directly to *Antwerp*, the Commodities they export to *Germany*, which would considerably diminish the Expences of the Freight, and the Price of the Merchandize, and infallibly procure a greater Consumption of them in *Germany*. I am not ignorant that two or three *Dutch* Towns would be infinitely dissatisfied with this Determination ; but convinced I am, that no Law can subject the Kings of *France* and *England*, and the Empress Queen, to the odious Obligation of sacrificing the most essential Interests of their People and Crowns, for fear of disobliging a few *Dutch* Merchants.

Notwithstanding these convincing Reasons, the *Dutch*, (if we may believe some private Reports) are sure of recovering a new and more advantageous Barrier than the
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the old one, by the Acquisition of *Antwerp* and *Dendermond*. Should this prove true, the Empress Queen would do infinitely better to renounce, once for all, the Low Countries; and *France* which formerly might have had good Reasons to propose it, has much better at present to prefer the Interests of the Empress Queen to those of the *Dutch*. But a more particular Examination of this Subject would carry us too far.

XXVIII.

THE Apologists of the pretended Preliminary Articles, influenced without doubt rather by their own private Interest, than by a real Love of the Glory of their Masters, and of the public Good, have recourse to Palliatives that are very far from founding a legitimate Excuse.

They tell us, that *France* never made a more glorious Peace, because it is a generous one; a Peace in which she sacrifices her own Interest, reserving to herself the Honour only of re-instating her Allies.

But the impartial Public will reply, that *France* never concluded a more ignominious Treaty, than that contained in the pretended Preliminary Articles, except those of *Bretigny* and *Madrid*. Besides, both these Treaties were excusable in some mea-

sure, by reason of the indispensable Necessity the Nation was reduced to, of putting an end to the Captivity of two of their illustrious Monarchs: whereas the gratuitous Cession of all the ancient Demesns of the Crown, recovered now by our Arms, would be so much the more dishonourable, as it is purely voluntary; and consequently it would be a free Sacrifice of the Blood, Property, and Conquests of the Nation, a Sacrifice which no Motive can engage us to make, no Pretext can excuse.

With respect to the Allies of *France*, they are as little satisfied with the Preliminaries, as the *French* themselves.

These Apologists pretend it is impossible for *France* to make a more advantageous Peace, because she attains thereby the End she proposed, which was to reduce the House of *Austria*.

But that this was the real Motive of the War, the impartial Public will not allow.

To ascribe it to a desire of reducing this House, would be attributing it to Motives of Jealousy and Ambition; Motives, to which his Majesty is utterly a Stranger. Besides, so far is this from being true, 'tis manifest the King did not determine to execute the Treaties which united him to the House of *Bavaria*, till he had in vain exerted

exerted all his Interest at the Court of *Vienna*, in endeavouring to obtain some small Satisfaction for the Electoral Family. Had that Court been persuaded to comply with the Advice and pressing Sollicitations of his Majesty, would it have been so much reduced as we now see it, and as it must be hereafter by the literal Execution of the Preliminaries, and of the pretended secret Article, of which we have above made mention?

The same Apologists add, that the King cannot give a greater Proof of Greatness of Soul, of Disinterestedness and Moderation, than by restoring to his Enemies their conquered Provinces; that his Majesty has often declared, he did not take up Arms to aggrandize himself, but to force his Enemies to a Peace; and that he ought therefore to fulfil his Declarations.

The impartial Public replies, that the King's Glory and Reputation in this respect are too well established, to be in the least affected by a Reservation of a weak Part of his Conquests. The whole Universe knows, that the Allurement of Conquests, how flattering soever to great Souls, and especially to potent Monarchs, never influenced his Conduct; that the abundant Harvest of Laurels with which his Royal



Front is adorned, ~~King~~ himself in his way, unsought by his Majesty; and that he has been forced, as it were, to conquer. He is too fond of his People, to sacrifice their Lives to the barbarous Pleasure of adding a few Towns to his Dominions. He is sensible he cannot lose any of his Subjects, without losing, at the same time, a Heart, in which his Virtues make him reign with as absolute a Command, as that which his Birth and the Laws give him over their Persons. Should a Courtier presume to advise him to make an idle Sport of a single Man's Life, he would hardly go unpunished; and how then could his Majesty listen to the Counsels of those who would persuade him to render the Loss of about four hundred thousand Lives an useless Sacrifice? He has undoubtedly too delicate a Conscience to expose himself to the continual Remorse that must arise from so criminal an Action.

Besides, his Majesty knows, 'tis the first Duty of Kings to provide for the Security of their Subjects; that the Protection they owe them, extends as well to the Reparation as Prevention of those Damages and Insults, to which they may be exposed; and that a Treaty of Peace redounds to their Glory, only as it is reconcileable to these Duties. And no doubt, but, upon this

this Principle, his Ministers must regulate the Definitive Treaty, be the Preliminaries what they will; If they are desirous of continuing to merit his Majesty's Confidence.

XXIX.

THE Declarations the King so often made, of taking up Arms, only to compel his Enemies to lay down theirs; of entering their Country, in order only to keep it as a *Depositum*, and with an Intent of restoring it to them after the Peace; supposed all along that his Enemies would not abuse, but comply with those Declarations, and contribute, on their part, to render his pacific Measures effectual. But since 'tis evident that those Measures, those Promises and Declarations, were unable to surmount the Obstinacy of his Enemies, and only encouraged them to continue the War, and multiply its Expence; the King is undoubtedly disengaged from any Obligation arising from those Declarations, by the Abuse made of them, and has a Right to indemnify his People, for the Damage and Expence which his Enemies might have easily spared them.

WE should be glad to know of these Apologists of the pretended Preliminary Articles, whether they are well assured that a Sacrifice of all our Conquests would produce their desired Effect? Or whether some People might not ascribe it to secret Springs, to criminal Intrigues, to an Apprehension that the new Laurels which Victory prepared for the Marshals *Saxe*, *Bellisle* and *Lowendal*, would raise their Credit to too high a Pitch; in fine, to the Ignorance, Corruption, and Venality of those who advised it? Whether among the Motives that could determine our Ministers to conclude a Treaty, so burdensome, and of course so dishonourable to the Nation, we are to reckon as nothing the March of the *Russian* Troops, the daily Losses of our Navy, the exaggerated Impoverishment of the People, the Incapacity of carrying on the War any longer, and a thousand other Motives, which would soon efface the Idea of Disinterestedness and Moderation? Had *France* even lost a great Number of Battles, had she undertaken a War as unjust as in its Principle it is certainly just, had Alliances been formed against her that are not thought of; could her

her Enemies even then prescribe to this Crown such a Peace as this; a Peace infinitely more cruel than War, which could hardly strip it, in a long time, of all those Conquests, whose Restitution is determined by those Preliminary Articles? Therefore we suppose them false; and Heaven grant they may prove so in every Point that raises our Alarms!

Suppose I am, at least, that the impartial Public does not view them in that favourable Light, in which those Apologists endeavour to make us consider them; and there is sufficient Reason to apprehend that Posterity will be induced to pass the same Judgment as the Public. This Apprehension alarms us so much the more, as the depending Treaty being the most interesting Epoch of the Age, it must decide the Glory of the present Reign, as well as the real Interest of the *French* Monarchy.

Let no one imagine any personal Interest has had a Share in these Reflections, which might furnish Matter for as many Memorials as here are Articles. They are Sentiments, that entirely flow from a pure Zeal for the public Good, and the national Honour.

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Queen his Mother, have made him of their Claims to the Successions of the Houses of *Austria, Farnese, and Medicis*? Yes really it does; and the reasonable and impartial Public is quite in the right to consider it only as a simple Plaister applied by an hostile or ignorant Hand, and fitter to palliate than to heal the deep Sores the present War has made in the House of *Bourbon*. After this War has cost the Lives of upwards of five hundred thousand *French, Spaniards, Genoese, and Neapolitans*; after these Nations have spent upwards of fourteen or fifteen hundred millions of Livres to support it; what is the Purchase of so much Blood and Treasure? Three small Dutchies, exhausted by frequent Wars, and of which the House of *Bourbon*